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The proliferation of mobile health (mHealth)—namely, mobile applications along with wearable and digital health 
devices—has helped to generate a growing amount of heterogeneous data. To increase devices’ and apps’ value via 
facilitating new ways to use data, mHealth companies often provide a Web application programming interface (API) to 
their cloud data repositories, which enables third-party developers to access end users’ data after receiving their 
consent. Managing such data sharing requires making design and governance decisions that maintain the tradeoff 
between promoting generativity to facilitate complementors’ contributions and retaining control to prevent undesirable 
platform use. However, despite the increasing pervasiveness of Web data-sharing platforms, researchers have not 
sufficiently analyzed their design and governance. By relying on boundary resource theory and analyzing documents 
about 21 Web data-sharing platforms, we identify and 18 design and governance decisions that mHealth companies 
must make to manage data sharing and discuss their role in maintaining the tradeoff between platform generativity 
and control. 
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1 Introduction 
Wearable devices have become more numerous, accurate, diverse, and affordable. In turn, these devices 
have led to an increasing amount of heterogeneous health and fitness data. Wearable producers typically 
provide an accompanying mobile app and Web service that allows users to analyze and interpret the data 
their devices generate. However, due to constraints associated with available resources and application 
scope, device producers use data in a limited number of ways. Therefore, to increase the value and sales 
of their hardware products and to create new applications, wearable manufacturers often open an 
application programming interface (API) to their data repository. Such a public Web API turns a Web data 
repository into a data-sharing platform that, with end users’ consent, enables third-party innovators to 
access end users’ data that wearable producers manage (Grundy, Held, & Bero, 2017).  
Data sharing1 holds many potential advantages for data consumers, providers, and their end users, which 
explains the growing number of data-sharing integrations in mobile health (mHealth) (Research2guidance, 
2016). Mobile health refers to the field that uses mobile applications and devices, which includes 
wearables, to help users achieve health, wellness, and fitness targets (Olla & Shimskey, 2015). However, 
open data sharing may challenge a data provider’s (e.g., a wearable device producer or another mHealth 
company) competitive position because its end-user service often relies on the shared data. Data 
providers can decrease such competitive risks by setting up restrictions and limitations on the data use, 
which, however, discourage third parties from collaborating. 
Data providers and consumers typically share mobile health data through platforms. Therefore, we can 
view the problem of facilitating third-party developers’ innovativeness while restricting their undesirable 
actions in a platform-design and governance context. Indeed, to attract a sufficient number of platform 
complementors (i.e., supply-side users), platform providers must enhance platform generativity that 
determines how easily complementors can leverage a platform to develop and provide services (Zittrain, 
2008). At the same time, a platform provider must define technical and business conditions that would 
govern how the complementors can use the platform and facilitate platform control. Maintaining the 
tradeoff between promoting generativity and keeping control represents a critical task in designing and 
governing platforms (Eaton, Elaluf-Calderwood, Sørensen, & Yoo, 2011; Förderer, Kude, Schütz, & 
Heinzl, 2014). However, research has not sufficiently analyzed this topic for increasingly ubiquitous data-
sharing platforms in general and mHealth data-sharing platforms in particular. Similarly, the more general 
literature on platform design and governance has scarcely and disjointedly analyzed the topic (Manner, 
Nienaber, Schermann, & Krcmar, 2013; Tiwana, Konsynski, & Bush, 2010), and most studies have 
primarily focused on large-scale marketplaces or mobile application platforms, such as the Apple’s App 
Store (e.g., Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013), Google Play, and Alibaba (e.g., Hein, Schreieck, Wiesche, 
& Krcmar, 2016). Such cases differ from the ones in mHealth not only in the opened resource type but 
also in platform size and architecture; thus, they potentially require different governance mechanisms 
(Tiwana, 2013). Furthermore, previous studies have not paid sufficient attention to the role of platform 
design and governance as means to reduce competition with complementors—a significant risk in 
mHealth because data providers and consumers serve the same end users relying on the overlapping 
(shared) data. Finally, mHealth differs from other analyzed platforms in that it deals with a highly sensitive 
resource—user data—which potentially demands special governance mechanisms. Therefore, motivated 
by the growing interconnection between mHealth applications and the scarcity of literature on designing 
and governing data platforms2, we examine the following research question:  
RQ: What design and governance decisions must mHealth companies make to manage Web 
mHealth data sharing?  
Recently, Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2013) conceptualized boundary resources as tools for managing 
platforms and stimulating their generativity while keeping control. Boundary resources include technical 
and non-technical tools, such as APIs and developer terms agreements, which enable platform providers 
to maintain an arm’s length relationship with third-party developers. Therefore, we analyzed boundary 
resources to answer our research question. To identify the case platforms to analyze, we selected 37 
mHealth companies most actively participating in data sharing, identified 192 integrations between them, 
and inspected these integrations to detect platforms that enabled data sharing. By doing so, we could also 
explore the mHealth data-sharing ecosystem and identify participating mHealth companies’ roles. Further, 
 
1 “Data sharing” refers to both providing and using (consuming) provided data. 
2 Hereafter, we use “data platform” and “data-sharing platform” interchangeably. 
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we collected and analyzed boundary resource documents (API references and developers’ terms) for the 
detected 21 web mHealth data-sharing platforms with openly available documentation to identify design 
and governance decisions that they used to manage data sharing.  
Synthesizing the design and governance decisions that platform providers have made for their existing 
mHealth data platforms can help strategic planners in entering the mHealth data-sharing ecosystem. 
Platform providers can use the defined decisions as levers to affect platform generativity and control. 
Further, researchers can use our results as a foundation for further explanatory analyses, such as to 
investigate the impact that each decision has on platform use in quantitative terms. Apart from mHealth 
industry, our results may also assist other domains in consumer Internet of things (IoT) and beyond where 
different parties share sensitive data and where sharing can potentially lead to competition between a 
data provider and complementor. Finally, by serving as an early example for examining how platform 
providers design and govern platforms to share data in the private sector, our study contributes to both the 
platform and data-sharing literatures. 
This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we present the background literature on APIs and 
platformization, platform design and governance, and data sharing and examine the current state of 
mHealth data sharing. In Section 3, we describe our research approach and selected cases. In Section 4, 
we present and examine the design and governance decisions that platform providers have made for 
sharing mHealth data. In Section 5, we discuss the impact that these decisions have on generativity and 
control and present challenges in designing and governing data sharing in mHealth. Finally, in Section 6, 
we conclude the paper. 
2 Background 
2.1 Platformization and Platform Types 
An application programming interface (API) constitutes a means to allow third parties to access an 
organization’s capabilities or data (Spencer, Krohn, Fisher, & Boyd, 2014). External APIs act as platform 
boundary resources: “the software tools and regulations that serve as the interface for the arm's-length 
relationship between the platform owner and the application developer” (Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013, 
p. 175). Therefore, external APIs drive product “platformization” (Helmond, 2015)—the process of making 
a platform from a non-platform good (Patel, 2015). In turn, information systems (IS) research typically 
understands a platform as an extensible software-based system with core functionality that modules that 
interoperate with it share (Tiwana et al., 2010). However, economists define a (multi-sided) platform as a 
market that enables direct interactions between several groups of users who make investments to affiliate 
with the platform and provide each other with network benefits (Hagiu & Wright, 2015). Although some 
platforms, such as Android OS, may comply with both definitions, some others meet only one. Thus, 
Airbnb represents a multi-sided (two-sided) market platform that lacks a platform’s features in an IS 
sense, whereas many IoT middleware solutions, such as Kaa3, that focus on simplifying IoT application 
development do not have a marketplace of third-party applications (Mineraud, Mazhelis, Su, & Tarkoma, 
2016) and, therefore, do not create a multi-sided market.  
One can categorize external APIs into three levels (Andreessen, 2007), which can serve as a basis for 
classifying platforms that public APIs enable. The first level, “access API”, allows external developers to 
access platforms’ data and capabilities by making calls—typically via protocols such as REST or SOAP. 
At the same time, developers’ applications reside outside the platforms. Fitbit API and the APIs of most 
other mHealth data platforms, which allow one to access platforms, exemplify access APIs. The second 
level, “plug-in API”, allows developers to “plug in” the functions they build into core platforms, although the 
application’s code runs outside the platforms. Browser plug-ins and extensions exemplify such APIs. 
Finally, the third level, “runtime environment API”, allows third-party applications to run on platforms 
themselves. An example includes Salesforce APIs (Helmond, 2015).  
2.2 Platform Design and Governance 
When designing platforms, designers must provide sufficient means and motivation for third-party 
developers (complementors) to join while ensuring that platform providers and complementors can create 
and capture value efficiently by imposing rules regulating participants’ behavior. Importantly, such rules 
 
3 https://www.kaaproject.org/overview/ 
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should not limit complementors’ creativity and platform generativity (Wareham, Fox, & Cano Giner, 2014), 
which refers to “a system’s capacity to produce unanticipated change through unfiltered contributions from 
broad and varied audiences” (Zittrain, 2008, p.70). System generativity involves five factors: leverage, 
adaptability, ease of mastery, accessibility, and transferability (Tilson, Sorensen, & Lyytinen, 2013; 
Zittrain, 2008). Leverage defines how well the system allows complementors to perform a certain task, 
adaptability determines how easily one can build on the system for a wide range of uses, ease of mastery 
refers to how easily one can learn to use the system, accessibility refers to the system’s openness and 
cost, and transferability determines the ease with which system users can transfer changes to other 
system users.  
Supporting generativity while keeping control represents a key challenge in designing and governing 
platforms (Constantinides, Henfridsson, & Parker, 2018; Eaton et al., 2011; Tiwana et al., 2010; Yoo, 
Boland, Lyytinen, & Majchrzak, 2012). In order to resolve this tradeoff, platform providers must carefully 
design the platform API and other boundary resources. Such resources, which can be technical (API) and 
social (guidelines and agreements) (Ghazawneh, 2012), play a two-fold role: platform resourcing 
(enhancing diversity) and securing (Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013), which makes them essential for 
managing the tradeoff that we discuss above. Therefore, the platform provider’s decisions on designing 
boundary resources bear strategic importance (Yoo, Henfridsson, & Lyytinen, 2010). 
The literature on platform design and governance remains scarce and fragmented (Manner et al., 2013; 
Tiwana et al., 2010). Moreover, existing studies seem to focus on mobile application platforms and, in 
particular, Apple. For example, Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2013) used the boundary resource model to 
analyze the actions Apple took to enhance the diversity of its platform while retaining control. Eaton et al. 
(2015) similarly focused on Apple to show how third-party developers affected how platform boundary 
resources evolved and, therefore, how Apple governed it. Apart from Apple, Manner et al. (2013) 
considered Google’s and Microsoft’s mobile application platforms. Furthermore, to more comprehensively 
understand platform governance, Hein et al. (2016) analyzed different types of multi-sided platforms: 
social networks (Facebook), merchants (Alibaba), service platforms (Airbnb and Uber), and application 
platforms (Google Play Store and Apple App Store). However, even they did not consider data-sharing 
platforms, although governing such platforms may differ from other cases for several reasons. For 
example, data providers typically open data they use in their end-user service for sharing. Furthermore, 
services that data-consuming complementors provide can resemble the provider’s services, which can 
lead the data consumer’s service to substitute rather than complement the data provider’s end-user 
service and, thereby, create a risk that platform providers need to resolve. Furthermore, no existing 
studies seem to have focused explicitly on platforms that rely on access APIs (Section 2.1). The difference 
in the platform API level (e.g., third level in Apple platform vs. first level in mHealth data-sharing platforms) 
may mean previous results have limited applicability because platform governance often relates to the 
platform architecture (Tiwana, 2013). With this study, we contribute to fulfilling these gaps. As such, our 
work represents an early effort into analyzing how platform providers design and govern platforms—which 
rely on access APIs—for sharing data (and mHealth data in particular). 
Researchers have recently proposed several conceptual frameworks of platform design and governance. 
Tiwana (2013) defined platform governance as a three-dimensional concept that includes pricing policies, 
a division of decision rights and responsibilities between the platform owner and participants, and control 
mechanisms. Economists have largely focused on the first dimension—that is, pricing (Eisenmann, 
Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2006)—and often ignored the other two. Tura, Kutvonen, and Ritala (2017) 
proposed a platform design framework with four elements: architecture, value creation logic, competition, 
and governance. Schreieck, Wiesche, and Krcmar (2016) identified the most studied design and 
governance concepts in the platform literature: roles, pricing, openness, and boundary resources. 
Because these frameworks are general in nature and describe high-level elements of platform design and 
governance, they can serve as a starting point for analyzing mHealth data-sharing platforms. However, 
given that no existing framework focuses particularly on data-sharing platforms, we adopted an inductive 
approach to analyze a platform’s boundary resources and, thus, determine specific design and 
governance decisions that platform providers make for mHealth data-sharing. In doing so, we ensured 
that we drew conclusions from the data rather than limiting our attention to pre-defined concepts. 
 
 
303 Design and Governance of mHealth Data Sharing 
 
Volume 45 10.17705/1CAIS.04518 Paper 18 
 
2.3 Data Sharing  
Data sharing can allow organizations to access complementary data sources and help them develop 
innovative applications and services. Actors in the public domain have long recognized data sharing’s 
potential. Indeed, “open data”, which refers to publicly funded data that mainly governmental organizations 
make available under non-restrictive conditions to enable innovative use cases, emerged from the public 
domain (Attard, Orlandi, Scerri, & Auer, 2015; Janssen, Charalabidis, & Zuiderwijk, 2012). However, data 
sharing in the public domain does not pose the same governance-related challenges as in the private 
domain (Eckartz, Hofman, & Van Veenstra, 2014). Therefore, the literature on open data does not 
typically address governance-related issues and cannot help one in designing and governing mHealth 
data sharing. 
Health information exchange (HIE) between different healthcare institutions, which primarily focuses on 
maintaining continuity of care, represents another government-driven data-sharing initiative. In some 
countries with a private healthcare system, healthcare institutions compete with each other and, therefore, 
may not wish to share data. Such “overprotectiveness” and various legal issues represent primary 
governance challenges in HIE in the United States (Allen et al., 2014). Although market- and data 
sensitivity-related challenges commonly arise in both HIE and mHealth data sharing, their design and 
governance differ. For instance, multiple organizations typically collaboratively govern HIE (Vest & Gamm, 
2010), whereas individual platform providers usually govern mHealth data sharing. Furthermore, HIE 
platforms must often adhere to stricter legal and technical requirements (e.g., Mello, Adler-Milstein, Ding, 
& Savage, 2018), whereas mHealth companies have more freedom in designing and governing data 
sharing.  
In the private domain, trusted partners mostly share data based on a bilateral agreement to minimize 
competition-related risks, such as in logistics and supply chain management (e.g., Lee & Whang, 2000). 
Open data sharing through public APIs remains less established, although the Web’s ubiquitous 
platformization has led some websites, notably social networks, to become data-sharing platforms. Thus, 
in 2006, Facebook introduced a Web API that enabled developers to bring users’ data into external 
applications and, thereby, turned into a data-sharing platform (Helmond, 2015). However, although 
researchers often use such platforms and APIs to collect data, little research on them exists (Bucher, 
2013). Studies that have specifically examined data-sharing platforms and APIs have often focused on the 
privacy and security concerns that personal data sharing may raise (e.g., Bodle, 2011; Puschmann & 
Burgess, 2014). Few studies seem to have addressed data sharing’s design and governance 
perspectives. Thus, Bucher (2013) investigated the Twitter ecosystem and briefly discussed how the 
platform provider governed its relations with third-party developers from the developers’ perspective. 
However, the author only analyzed the regulating role of API conceptually and did not define mechanisms 
that platform provides use to manage data sharing. Furthermore, Facebook and Twitter, which 
researchers have typically studied as data-sharing platforms, have a dominant role, which does not 
always apply for mHealth data sharing where complementors and platform providers may equal each 
other in size, which increases the competitive risks they experience from sharing data.  
Finally, only a few studies have focused specifically on data sharing in mHealth. For instance, de Arriba-
Pérez, Caeiro-Rodríguez, and Santos-Gago (2016) identified four different mHealth data-sharing 
approaches: 1) direct sensor, 2) indirect sensor, 3) direct warehouse, 4) indirect warehouse. In direct 
sharing, a third party receives the data to its cloud directly from a sensor or warehouse (cloud). In indirect 
sharing, a sensor or warehouse requires some intermediary system or gateway (e.g., a smartphone) to 
send data to the third party. The authors found that differences in data-sharing approaches and data 
models hinder mHealth’s interoperability and development. Further, in a descriptive study in which they 
examined an mHealth data-sharing ecosystem, Grundy et al. (2017) conducted a network analysis of 
data-sharing links between mHealth apps and identified apps that had a central position in the ecosystem. 
They found that a highly interconnected market causes considerable privacy and security concerns.  
Overall, open (as opposed to bilateral agreement-based) data sharing in the private domain constitutes a 
relatively new development; therefore, the literature on designing and governing such data sharing 
remains scarce, especially in cases where data sharing may challenge platform providers’ and 
complementors’ competitive position as in mHealth data sharing. Therefore, we contribute to filling this 
gap in this paper by analyzing how platform providers design and govern open data sharing in mHealth.  
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2.4 Current State of Data Sharing in mHealth 
As an industry, mobile health continues to grow: in 2017, app stores contained 325,000 health, fitness, 
and medical apps—78,000 more than in 2016 (Research2guidance, 2017). To increase the customer 
base and engagement, mHealth companies use APIs to enable developers to share collected data with 
other developers. In 2016, 58 percent of mHealth developers participated in data sharing compared with 
42 percent in 2015 (Research2guidance, 2016), which makes mHealth an advanced market in the API 
economy. Until recently, organizations predominantly shared mHealth data through peer-to-peer (P2P) 
API integrations. However, in 2014, Apple and Google launched their mHealth data-aggregating platforms 
Apple Health and Google Fit, respectively, to provide a central place for storing scattered mHealth data 
and facilitate data sharing by eliminating the need for non-scalable P2P integrations. The architectures of 
Apple’s and Google’s platforms significantly differ. While Google stores mHealth data in a cloud 
repository, Apple keeps the data locally on a device: iPhone or Apple Watch. Apart from their data-sharing 
capability, both Apple and Google provide developers with tools to access mobile devices’ sensors. As a 
result, data sharing through hub platforms has significantly increased, although P2P connections to 
proprietary platforms account for a large part of mHealth data-sharing integrations (Research2guidance, 
2016). 
3 Research Approach and Cases 
3.1 Case Selection 
To determine the design and governance decisions that mHealth companies make to manage Web 
mHealth data sharing, we focused on identifying the mHealth data-sharing ecosystem’s most active 
applications and services rather than mapping the ecosystem in its entirety. We considered data sharing 
as either third parties’ opening the data they own or their consuming the data from other providers. We 
also considered only data-generating device producers that could control data sharing. Thus, we 
excluded, for example, smartwatches that run on Wear OS, which have raw sensor data that third parties 
can access through an API as a part of OS functionality and Bluetooth sensors that broadcast data in a 
standardized open format following General Attributes (GATT) profile specifications.   
We summarize the logic we used to select relevant applications and services in Figure 1. We first picked 
the apps that had a central position in mHealth data-sharing landscape according to Grundy et al. (2017): 
MyFitnessPal, MapMyFitness/Run, Endomondo, RunKeeper, Lose It!, HealthMate (Nokia), Jawbone UP, 
Lifesum, Samsung Health, Strava, Apple HealthKit, Fitbit, and Runtastic. We excluded some non-mHealth 
apps, such as Facebook and Twitter, even though they connect to many mHealth services. 
Then, based on an industry report (research2guidance, 2016), we added leading data and API 
aggregation services: Google Fit, Validic, and Human API4. After that, by browsing the directories of 
partners that the selected 16 services shared data with, we identified apps connected to each app and 
service we initially selected and additionally picked those ones that shared data with at least three of 
them. In some cases, partner listings were missing or incomplete; however, we used the best available 
information. After reviewing the picked apps, we omitted some due to their either inactivity (no app version 
updates for more than a year, such as EveryMove) or our inability to validate the existence of 
connections5. Overall, in addition to the initially selected 16 apps and services, we added 21 more, which 
resulted in 37 in total (see Appendix A).  
From the 37 apps and services we selected, we removed ones that did not share data through their own 
proprietary API (Figure 1), which left 26 apps and services. Subsequently, we removed five apps and 
services that did not have publicly available documentation for their APIs. Furthermore, to ensure the 
comparability of cases, we selected only Web APIs since they constitute the prevailing way to share data. 
As a result, we obtained 19 apps and services and 20 APIs (Validic had two Web APIs). Finally, we added 
two more platform APIs (Dexcom and PredictBG) to account for medical (rather than pure fitness) apps 
and services to ensure we analyzed diverse mHealth data-sharing platforms. Thus, we ended up 21 apps 
and services and 22 APIs in total (see Table A1). 
 
4 We excluded Open Health due to negative dynamics in the share of mHealth developers using it. 
5 We could not verify Validic’s and Human API’s connections because they operated only in business-to-business (B2B) segment. 
However, we included all connections that their websites listed. 
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Figure 1. Case Selection 
3.2 Research Approach 
To understand the design and governance decisions that platform providers make to manage how third 
parties use their Web data-sharing platforms6, we analyzed the 21 platforms’ boundary resources. Figure 
2 presents our research approach that included an inductive content analysis, a commonly used method 
to classify written or spoken materials into categories (e.g., Cho & Lee, 2014). After we selected the 
cases, we conducted open coding on the API reference documents. Open coding refers to the process in 
which one attaches labels to data to develop codes that accurately describe or classify the phenomenon 
of interest (Flock, 2009). In practice, we labeled any information that could pertain to the research 
question (i.e., any factors that potentially defined how platform providers manage data sharing). When 
coding subsequent documents, we mapped information to the previously emerged codes whenever 
possible or added new codes when necessary. After we initially coded all API references, we revised the 
codes: we aggregated codes with similar meaning and omitted irrelevant ones. After that, we revisited the 
data using the revised list of codes and tabulated the resulting factors that affect platform use. The table 
included the factors (code labels) as columns, APIs as rows, and the values of the factors as cells. We 
first coded API references and other technical documents and after that API license agreements. We also 
used other sources, such as developer forums, when needed (e.g., to fill missing information or resolve 
ambiguities). During the process, we conducted three unstructured interviews with technology experts to 
check our general research logic and initial findings. After we completed the coding stage, we conducted 
cross-case comparisons in which we looked for differences in the mHealth data-sharing platforms’ 
boundary resources. Further, we selected only those data-sharing design and governance factors that 
differed for at least two platform APIs and formalized them as data-sharing design and governance 
decisions. We followed the logic that, if different data-sharing companies handled an issue in a different 
way, such companies could choose between several options to handle the issue. Further, by comparing 
multiple cases, we could gather different options or alternatives for each design and governance decision. 
We also elaborated on the decisions based on the reviewed documentation and supplementary Web 
material and categorized them based on their focus. In addition, we conducted two semi-structured 
research interviews with the API experts from wearable device companies to refine the decisions we 
identified and understand platform providers’ motivation for making particular decisions. We reference the 
insights that the interviewed experts shared with the codes WD1 and WD2. 
 
6 Hereafter, we refer to “Web data-sharing platforms” to as “data-sharing platforms” for brevity. 
13 apps centrally 
positioned in mHealth 
data sharing ecosystem 
+ 3 leading data and API 
aggregators 
21 apps connected to at 
least three of the 16 
initially selected
37 apps and services 
actively participating in 
mHealth data sharing
192 data sharing 
connections
(Figure 3)
26 apps and services 
providing data sharing 
platforms
21 apps and services 
providing data sharing 
platforms with open docs
19 apps and services 
providing web data 
sharing platforms with 
open docs
21 apps and services 
providing web data 
sharing platforms with 
open docs, including 2 
manually selected 
medical apps
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Figure 2. Research Approach 
4 Design and Governance Decisions of Web mHealth Data Sharing 
Table 1 presents 18 key design and governance decisions that regulate the Web platform-based mHealth 
data sharing, alternatives for each decision, and examples that show the choices that two large wearable 
device producers (Fitbit and Polar) made. We list only the most important decisions rather than them all 
based on the platform cross-case comparison. We divide the decisions into four groups: 1) high-level 
data-sharing strategy, 2) data-scope governance, 3) platform design, and 4) platform-governance 
decisions. While the first group covers decisions that any stakeholder participating in data sharing must 
make, the second one pertains to data providers and platform providers, and the last two groups pertain to 
platform providers. At the same time, complementors (platform consumers) can use the table as a tool to 
evaluate potential data-sharing collaborations with platform providers. 
4.1 High-level Data-sharing Strategy 
First, an mHealth company has to define its data-sharing role (Decision 1); namely, whether it provides, 
consumes, or both provides and consumes mHealth data (data prosumers). This decision connects to a 
company’s type and services. Thus, data producers typically manufacture devices (e.g., Polar) and/or 
provide other service that facilitate data logging (e.g., calorie counter MyFitnessPal), whereas data 
consumers use the data that producers generate to, for example, provide wellness coaching (e.g., Tactio 
Health). Some data providers can also be prosumers, such as Fitbit (Table 1), which not only allow others 
to access data from its service but also receive data from other mHealth data providers.  
Next, a company must define its data-platform role: platform provider, consumer (also known as 
complementor), or prosumer (Decision 2). Designing and supporting a platform requires considerable 
investment, and companies run the risk that they will not be able to attract complementors. Therefore, in 
the mHealth ecosystem where many companies have a data-sharing platform (which includes the 
aggregator platforms that Apple, Google, and Samsung operate), organizations can often share data by 
connecting to desirable collaborators’ platforms. On the other hand, by deploying such integrations, 
companies come to depend on platform providers, which can change their API at any moment and lead to 
breakdowns in the platform consumer’s services (e.g., Rafiq, Ågerfalkm, & Sjöström, 2013) or discontinue 
the complementors’ access to the platform altogether. Therefore, the decision whether to rely on partners’ 
platforms, to open one’s own platform, or to combine the two has strategic importance in data sharing. 
When deciding a data-platform role, mHealth companies must particularly consider the extent to which 
they will use data aggregator (hub) platforms, such as Google Fit and Apple HealthKit. Data hubs have 
many benefits: for instance, they can facilitate data sharing by eliminating the need for peer-to-peer 
22 proprietary web 
APIs for mHealth 










Dissimilarities between cases 
are formalized as decisions
Case selection and 
data collection Data coding
Analyzing data;
developing a construct (decisions)
Decisions are elaborated and 
categorized
Three unstructured interviews with 
technology experts in consumer and 
medical devices and APIs to check 
general research logic and findings
Initial open data coding
Interviews with two wearable device 
vendors to refine the decisions
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integrations (Apple, n.d.). Therefore, some mHealth companies implement a connection to Apple Health 
or Google Fit as their first (and sometimes only) integration (e.g., Oura Ring and Xiaomi). At the same 
time, hubs do not seem to completely substitute proprietary platforms. Thus, for example, in October 
2017, Polar opened its previously moderated API rather than expanding data sharing through hubs.  
Table 1. Key Design and Governance Decisions for Managing Web mHealth Data Sharing 
Decision Alternatives Ex.1: Fitbit Ex.2: Polar 
High-level data sharing strategy (all actors) 
1) Data-sharing role 
Data provider, consumer, or 
prosumer 
Data prosumer Data provider 
2) Data-platform role 
Platform provider, consumer, or 
prosumer 
Platform prosumer Platform prosumer 
Governance of data scope (data providers, platform providers) 
3) Data types shared 
Limited or not limited. 
(Provided: all collected or 
some. Accepted: custom data 
types allowed or not) 
Provided: not limited (all 
collected) 
Accepted: custom data not 
allowed 
Provided: limited (except 
sleep data) 
4) Granularity of provided 
data 
Limited or not limited. 
(Provided: summaries/ samples 
or most granular available. 
Accepted:  granularity restricted 
or not) 
Provided: limited for heart rate 
and activity data; not limited 
with special permission 
Accepted: limited (no time 
series logging) 
Provided: limited (no 
granular daily activity 
data) 
5) Timeliness of provided 
data 
As soon as available or 
delayed 
As soon as available As soon as available 
Platform design (platform providers) 
6) Number of APIs to a 
data platform 
One or more One One 
7) Platform API rights Read, write, or both Both Read only 
8) Architectural style of 
API 
REST API or other REST API REST API 
9) Data change detection 
mechanisms 
Polling, pull notifications, 
subscription API (“webhook”)  
Subscription API Pull notifications 
10)  Data access 
authorization 
OAuth (1 or 2: authorization 
code grant or other grant type), 
or other 
OAuth 2.0: Authorization code 
grant, Implicit grant 
OAuth 2.0: Authorization 
code grant 
11) Supported data 
format 
JSON, XML, FIT, GPX, TCX, or 
other 
Read: JSON, TCX; Write: 
JSON 
Read: JSON, XML, FIT, 
GPX, TCX 
Platform governance (platform providers) 
12) Platform openness 
Open, semi-open, moderated, 
or hidden 
Semi-open, access to granular 
data requires special 
permission 
Open 
13) API usage-rate limits Yes or no Yes Yes 
14) Price of API usage Free, paid, or freemium Free Free 
15) Revenue sharing / 
affiliate program 
Yes or no No No 
16) Directory of partners 
using API 
Yes or no Yes Yes 
17) Secondary sharing of 
data that platform 
provides 
Prohibited or not explicitly 
prohibited 
Prohibited Not explicitly prohibited 
18) Platform consumers’ 
use of historical data after 
the integration is 
terminated 
Prohibited or not explicitly 
prohibited 
Not explicitly prohibited Prohibited 
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Figure 3 illustrates the data-platform roles of mHealth companies active in sharing. To identify a 
company’s data-platform role, we examined 192 direct data-sharing links between 37 studied mHealth 
companies (see Figure 1). We identified the links via searching the Web and conducting app-usage 
experiments. For each integration, we defined the two parties that participated in data sharing as either a 
resource provider (API and platform) or a client. We identified the resource provider (API) by spotting 
which service provider authorizes a connection. To do so, we relied on OAuth: a standard in mHealth that 
organizations use to enable an end user (resource owner) to grant websites or applications (client) access 
to the information stored in another website (resource server) without disclosing the password. 
 
Figure 3. mHealth Data-sharing Apps and Services by the Number of Inbound and Outbound API Integrations 
Figure 3 indicates the number of inbound and outbound integrations between the 37 mHealth companies 
we studied. Each point’s color indicates a company’s data-platform role: red for (clear) platform providers, 
green for (clear) platform consumers, and blue for platform prosumers. Out of the 37 companies we 
studied, four represented platform providers, 11 represented platform consumers, and the remaining 22 
represented platform prosumers (the figure does not depict them all). Depending on the relation of 
inbound and outbound integrations, some prosumers represented a platform provider more than 
consumers. For example, Jawbone and Fitbit had only one outbound integration but more than 10 
inbound integrations, which shows that they mostly shared data using their own APIs. On the other hand, 
Tomtom and Endomondo had considerably less inbound integrations than outbound, which means that 
they mostly represented platform consumers. 
Overall, a company planning to participate in data sharing can define its high-level strategy and position 
itself by choosing between 15 possible combinations of the four elementary roles that we present in Table 
2. These roles build on a company’s data-sharing role and data-platform role. The elementary roles A, B, 
C, and D represent “clear” production or consumption roles that exclude data and platform “prosumption”. 
The prosumption roles exist in multiple configurations, which the four elementary roles in combination 
describe. For example, Fitbit followed the ABCD configuration (data prosumer/platform prosumer). In turn, 
Polar followed the AB configuration (data provider/platform prosumer). Finally, Google Fit and Samsung 
Health followed the AC configuration (data prosumer/platform provider). 
Table 2. High-level Data-sharing Strategies 
 Platform provider Platform consumer 
Data provider A B 
Data consumer C D 
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After a company chooses a high-level data-sharing strategy, data providers and platform providers (roles 
A, B, and C) must decide how they will govern data scope (see Section 4.2), and platform providers (roles 
A and C) must additionally decide how they will design and govern their platform (see Sections 4.3 and 
4.4). Companies must make different although interconnected decisions for each component in their high-
level data-sharing strategy. For example, as a data provider/platform provider (role A), Polar would need 
to decide on the data it shares through its platform and define how it would design and govern its platform. 
In turn, as a data provider/platform consumer (role B), Polar would need to decide on the data it shares 
through each third party’s platform.  
4.2 Governance of Data Scope 
If a company decides to share data by providing data or a data platform, it further should decide whether 
to limit the type of data it shares or not (Decision 3). Thus, data consumers/platform providers (role C in 
Table 2) must decide whether to accept custom data types, although they typically allow only pre-defined 
data types. Data providers (roles A and B) must decide what available data types they want third-party 
developers to access. On the one hand, end users own most mHealth data; as such, they should be able 
to control how other parties use their data. On the other hand, data providers may want to keep some data 
types private and accessible uniquely from the proprietary service to maintain a competitive advantage 
(WD1). Thus, for example, Jawbone did not provide “advanced sensor data” such as galvanic skin 
response and temperature (which many other fitness trackers do not feature) to complementors, and 
Polar did not provide sleep data to complementors.  
Furthermore, data providers can limit the level of detail in the data they provide to others (Decision 4). 
Thus, many service providers share only summarized data on a daily or per-activity basis (e.g., Tomtom 
and Misfit). Data providers may use access to granular data as a premium feature. Thus, Garmin delivers 
a second-level activity data for a US$5,000 license fee, while Fitbit grants access to granular activity and 
heart rate data only to selected partners. Data consumers/platform providers (role C) can similarly limit 
data granularity.  
Typically, data providers allow consumers to access data as soon as it becomes available on the platform 
(e.g., Fitbit and Polar). However, in some cases, providers may decide to delay data delivery (Decision 5). 
Among the data providers we studied, only Dexcom explicitly used delayed data delivery: it sent glucose 
measurements to partners with a three-hour delay to prevent health-critical data uses (Comstock, 2017). 
We did not find any such limitation in platforms that enable third parties to write data; therefore, data 
consumers/platform providers in practice do not seem to make Decision 5.  
4.3 Platform Design  
Service providers that intend to share data through their own proprietary Web platform have to decide 
whether to provide one or more APIs for the platform (Decision 6). Providing multiple Web APIs implies 
issuing different API access keys and having a separate developer-registration process. Therefore, 
multiple APIs may be sensible for separating different groups of platform users as with Validic, which had 
one API for data providers (typically mHealth companies) and one for data consumers (e.g., healthcare 
organizations). Furthermore, different APIs may provide access to different data as with Garmin, which 
had a paid API for granular training data and free API for daily activity data. However, providers typically 
open one Web API (e.g., Fitbit and Polar). 
Service providers that decide to open a web API for data sharing must define whether third parties can 
use their API to read data from the platform, write it, or for both purposes (Decision 7 in Table 1 and 
Figure 4). This decision depends on the selected data-sharing role. Thus, for example, if a platform 
provider represents a data provider (role A), its API should provide “read” rights. All studied APIs (except 
Validic Connect) allowed complementors to read data. When an API also permits complementors to write 
data, they can use the platform as a backup or even primary storage location. Twelve out of 22 studied 
APIs allowed complementors to write data, such as Fitbit, Strava, and Google Fit. 
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Figure 4. Possible Web Data-sharing Arrangements (Read Only, Write Only, and Read and Write API Rights); 
Arrow Shows the Data-flow Direction 
Furthermore, Web platform providers have to choose an architectural API style (Decision 8). Currently, 
representational state transfer (REST) dominates other Web API architectures due to its simplicity 
compared to other approaches and its reliance on standard HTTP operations; however, other alternatives 
exist (Lensmar, 2013). Out of the studied Web API providers, Garmin’s Connect API did not seem to 
comply with the REST architecture because it supported only the “push” data-transfer method (Garmin, 
n.d.), whereas REST uses the synchronous “pull” data-transfer method in which data consumers can 
detect changes in data by regularly polling the provider’s server. However, apart from standard polling, 
providers may decide to offer other asynchronous mechanisms for detecting new data (Decision 9), which 
also deviate from traditional REST architecture. Only platform providers that allow complementors to read 
data from their platform should make this decision (platform API rights = read or both). Thus, Polar 
implemented pull notifications in its REST API, which allows data consumers to check whether their end 
users have any new data available for download. This approach differs from polling in that it requires 
complementors to send a request to receive information on new data for all authorized users and data 
types. Fitbit took another approach to notify data consumers: it provided a subscription API (a “webhook”) 
that allowed data consumers to receive a notification that new data has arrived for separate end users. In 
some cases, access to subscription API requires the provider’s approval (e.g., Strava, iHealth).  
Service providers can share end users’ data if end users authorize such sharing; therefore, planning the 
data access-authorization mechanism represents a crucial platform design decision (Decision 10). Almost 
all mHealth APIs we studied used OAuth 2.0, the de facto standard for authorizing Web data sharing. 
However, some service providers still used the first version of the OAuth protocol (e.g., Nokia, Fatsecret) 
or client login authentication (PredictBGL). OAuth 2.0 authorization’s design requires platform providers to 
make further decisions, which include defining the scope for what data types the application may access 
and the method through which end users authorize complementors to access their data on the platform 
(referred to as authorization grant type). Thus, while Polar used only an authorization code grant type 
suitable for Web and native apps with a Web-service component, Fitbit also supported an implicit grant 
type suitable for apps without a Web service.  
Finally, API designers should decide the data formats they will support (Decision 11). Most API providers 
we studied used the JSON format to send and receive data (typical for REST APIs). However, some 
platform providers additionally supported XML and fitness-specific data formats such as GPX, TCX, and 
FIT. Thus, in addition to JSON, Fitbit provided training data in TCX format, whereas Polar also supported 
XML, FIT, GPX, and TCX.  
4.4 Platform Governance 
Platform openness represents perhaps the most essential platform governance decision (Decision 12). 
Some data-sharing platforms we reviewed (e.g., Polar) adopted an open approach. Open data-sharing 
platforms allow developers to register, access features, and obtain API keys without restrictions. Semi-
open data-sharing platforms provide developers with access to basic features after registration but require 
the provider’s approval to access certain functions (e.g., Fitbit, which kept access to granular data private, 
and Strava, which enabled a webhook for selected developers). Furthermore, moderated data-sharing 
platforms grant an API key only when they approve a developer and app. Moderated platforms include 
MyFitnessPal and Garmin, which did not have openly available documentation for their APIs. Some 
platforms, such as Dexcom, adopted an open approach for prototyping but a moderated one for the 
production stage. Finally, one can further classify some moderated platforms as hidden with no public 
information on their existence. For example, Endomondo has such a platform, which, for example, 
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Platform providers can also limit the number of API calls when governing their Web data platforms 
(Decision 13). For example, providers can set call limits for different periods, such as a minute, an hour, or 
a day. In the documentation for the 22 APIs we studied, 13 specified call limits, two mentioned call limits 
but did not specify them, and the rest either did not mention call limits or such limits did not exist. 
Furthermore, platform providers must decide whether and how to charge for API access (Decision 14). In 
mHealth, platform providers typically expect data sharing to pay off indirectly through an increase in their 
sales and consumer base. Therefore, platform consumers do not typically pay for using the API (e.g., 
APIs of Fitbit and Polar are free). However, some providers adapted a freemium model in that they 
charged either for high API usage that exceeded set limits (TomTom, MapMyFitness, Fatsecret) or for 
access to certain data (PredictBG). Some mHealth APIs adopted a paid model. Thus, Garmin charged a 
one-time license fee (US$5,000) for access to its Connect API, although it shared less granular data for 
free through its Garmin Health API. Similarly, Samsung charged for the access to its REST API, although 
we could not locate any publicly available pricing details. Finally, Validic and Human API provided a 
commercial mediator service and naturally charged for their service (i.e., API usage). On the other hand, 
some data providers may decide to share the revenue that data consumer stimulate when using the API 
(Decision 15). For example, Runkeeper initially gave away 50 percent of the premium service sales driven 
that its partners drove (Runkeeper, n.d.), although it later shut the referral program down. Thus, revenue 
sharing does not exist in current mHealth data-sharing platforms.  
Web platform providers may further attract more data consumers and increase their sales if they open a 
partner app directory (Decision 16). Many two-sided markets inherently include such a directory, but not 
all mHealth data-sharing platforms feature them. Nine out of 21 Web platform providers we studied, which 
included Fitbit and Polar, had partner app listings on their websites. In some other cases, we could access 
the information on compatible apps on webpages that explained how to connect the apps (e.g., 
MapMyFitness) or such information was not available at all (e.g., Nike+ Run).  
Due to the high interconnectedness between mHealth companies, data consumer can further send the 
data that data provider shares to another service provider. Thus, platform providers should decide their 
position on such secondary sharing of data they provide (Decision 17). Some companies such as Polar 
did not explicitly prohibit such sharing, whereas Fitbit and Dexcom did not allow it. Some end users exploit 
secondary sharing to enable a data flow between indirectly integrated services (Long, 2015). 
Finally, platform providers must decide whether platform and data consumers can use data shared with 
them after the integration between platform provider and consumer ends (Decision 18). In this situation, 
some providers (e.g., Polar) required consumers to delete all data they received, which may constitute a 
switching cost for data consumers given the potential importance of historical data for improving 
algorithms and services (due to the so-called “data network effect”) (Turck, 2016). At the same time, 
platform providers may not easily be able to monitor whether data consumers fulfill this condition. Some 
other platform providers, such as Fitbit, had license agreements that did not explicitly prohibit data 
consumers from using historical data after an integration’s termination. 
5 Discussion 
5.1 Impact of Design and Governance Decisions on Generativity and Control  
Table 1 defines decisions that companies must make to manage mHealth data sharing and resolve the 
tradeoff between enhancing generativity and maintaining control. Thus, without proper control, an mHealth 
company that wants to increase the value of its own mHealth service by allowing others to access its data 
and enabling new use cases may lose a competitive advantage. While the first two decisions in Table 1 
determine a company’s roles and high-level data-sharing strategy, the other 16 decisions can have a 
greater or lesser effect on platform generativity or control. Thus, by regulating the scope of the data that 
they make available (Decisions 3-5), data providers can affect their generativity by changing shared data’s 
adaptability7  as Figure 5 shows. Indeed, fewer data types, lower data granularity, and delayed data 
delivery result in less adaptable data and restrict the innovative applications and services it can enable. At 
the same time, providing limited data does not challenge the provider’s competitive position. 
 
7 Hereafter, we refer to the generativity factors as according to Zittrain (2008) as we describe in Section 2.2 
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Figure 5. Relationship between Shared Data, Control, Adaptability, and Generativity 
Platform providers may also use other decisions (Decisions 6-18) to manage their data platform and data 
sharing. Some decisions directly relate to platform generativity and control, some indirectly relate to it, 
and, in some cases, an increase in platform generativity does not come at the cost of less platform 
control. For example, openness (Decision 12) immediately affects a platform’s control and generativity 
through accessibility. Similarly, API usage-rate limits (Decision 13) can restrict a platform’s accessibility 
and adaptability while allowing stricter control. In practice, platform providers impose API usage-rate limits 
to protect their servers against negative impact on service quality due to too many requests (WD2) or use 
it as a differentiator between free and premium services. Charging for API usage (Decision 14) can 
decrease platform accessibility and, therefore, generativity, while sharing the revenue (Decision 15) will 
likely have the opposite effect. Further, having a partner directory (Decision 16) can increase platform 
leverage and, therefore, motivate some third-party developers to join the platform. Similarly, non-
prohibitive policies on secondary data sharing (Decision 17) and data use after a data-sharing 
integration’s termination (Decision 18) may have a positive effect on platform generativity (adaptability and 
accessibility).  
Platform design decisions typically have a less evident impact on generativity or control than platform 
governance- and data scope-related decisions do. Thus, platform providers can use several APIs 
(Decision 6) to separate platform consumers into different groups (e.g., data providers and data 
consumers) and tune platform openness and control with greater granularity. Although having several 
platform APIs instead of one may decrease platform accessibility for some platform consumers, for others, 
providing several APIs with clearer focus may enhance the ease with which platform consumers can 
master the platform. Further, expanding platform API rights (Decision 7) from read only to read and write 
can open new platform uses and, hence, potentially increase platform leverage. Finally, a platform’s 
technical functionality (Decisions 8-11) can indirectly affect platform generativity through ease of mastery: 
the more familiar to third-party developers the platform functionality, the lower the learning curve, and the 
easier users can use the platform.  
5.2 Challenges of mHealth Data Sharing Design and Governance 
Apart from managing the tradeoff between promoting generativity and keeping control, in managing 
mHealth data sharing, platform providers face other challenges that the industry as a whole needs to 
address to increase the benefits from sharing data. Table 3 summarizes eight such challenges that we 
identified based on analyzing boundary resources and research interviews.  
We found that data consumer and provider roles typically operate separately from each other, which 
means that data prosumers do not commonly appear in mHealth even though many data providers can 
benefit from using complementary data that other parties generate—likely because some providers have 
concerns about using other companies’ data due to its unknown quality (WD2). Uncertain data quality 
constitutes a central problem in the data economy (Challenge 1), which calls for organizations to establish 
quality-control mechanisms (Koutroumpis, Leiponen, & Thomas, 2017). 
Furthermore, with multiple data-sharing platforms, some platform providers could remain unconnected 
due to their mutual unwillingness to make yet another investment in establishing and maintaining an 
integration to another company’s platform (Challenge 2). Recently emerged data aggregators or hubs, 
such as Google Fit and Apple Health, improve the interconnection in the industry and data-sharing 
efficiency by decreasing the number of required integrations. However, hubs do not seem to completely 
substitute for proprietary platforms partially because they use data models that do not suit some mHealth 
companies (WD1) (Challenge 3). Furthermore, the unwillingness to collaborate with hubs may also relate 
to the potentially negative business impact from such collaboration (Challenge 4). Namely, sharing data 
Strict control, low 
adaptability, low 
generativity
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through a hub implies that a company loses control over the process as the data uploaded to such 
platform becomes available to other platform participants under the license terms that the platform 
provider defines. This loss of control may explain why some service providers, notably Fitbit, did not share 
any data with hub platforms. Therefore, hub platform providers should increase the attractiveness of their 
platforms to data providers by, for example, enhancing the potential value that data-providing 
complementors gain from consuming data (e.g., through promoting the diversity of available data types 
and assuring data quality). 
While data overprotectiveness inhibits data sharing, some mHealth companies, particularly wearable 
device producers, willingly outsource a service part of their product to complementors and, therefore, 
make all data that their devices capture available to others (WD1, WD2). Such companies seem to view 
themselves predominantly as hardware business and do not pay as much attention to providing services 
as they do to producing devices. Although this approach works well for device producers now, it may pose 
a challenge in the future with the commoditization of sensors (Challenge 5). Similar to handset industry, 
mHealth can move from the hardware to software and service-driven stage of development (Kekolahti, 
Kilkki, Hämmäinen, & Riikonen, 2016) once the hardware starts to be good enough for the average 
consumer’s needs. In fact, the commoditization of wearable devices has already seemingly begun. 
Xiaomi, a Chinese manufacturer that offers low-priced fitness trackers, was the second largest wearable 
device producer by units shipped in 2017 (IDC, 2018). Despite the low price, researchers found Xiaomi Mi 
2 Band to be as accurate as the nearly three times more expensive Fitbit Charge HR (Tam & Cheung, 
2018). As such, we can see that differentiating hardware has become more difficult and that competition 
may gradually shift from focusing on devices to services and the third-party developer ecosystem. 
Therefore, device producers should focus more on providing in-house services and pay higher attention to 
how they govern data sharing. 
The debatable sustainability of free data sharing that currently prevails in mHealth may pose another 
challenge (Challenge 6). Indeed, organizations commonly share mHealth data without charge since 
collaborations add value to both data providers’ and data consumers’ services, while the party that will 
likely benefit more typically pays for deploying the integration. However, maintaining the platform costs 
money as well, and some platform providers seem to find it difficult to monetize data sharing indirectly 
through additional sales, which may explain why some providers, such as Runkeeper, stopped accepting 
new developer registrations (WD1) and why other platform providers stopped updating their API. One 
potential way to resolve this problem involves applying an Internet peer-like pricing: if both parties equally 
benefit from the connection, then the platform consumer does pay a fee for API access. However, if one 
party will benefit more, it may have to pay not only for the deployment of the integration but also for the 
API access. This solution, however, will increase the transaction cost of establishing data-sharing 
collaborations. Nevertheless, with the commoditization of wearable devices and growing competition on 
mHealth’s hardware side, charging for API access in the future may be a reasonable revenue opportunity 
for device producers. 
Furthermore, sharing data in mHealth involves challenges that relate to the need to comply with numerous 
regulatory requirements (Challenge 7). For example, in the European Union, the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) regulation protects mHealth data. The regulation defines (among other things) 
requirements and lawful basis for personal data processing (Eur-Lex, 2016). Some interpretations 
understand mHealth data as sensitive personal data (Malgieri & Comandé, 2017) that organizations can 
process based on special lawful grounds, such as receiving explicit user consent, which users typically 
provide when installing an application. Enabling data sharing requires an organization to obtain a separate 
explicit authorization that they generally implement with the OAuth 2.0 standard (see Section 4.3). After a 
data provider transmits data to a complementor, the receiving party’s terms govern it, which puts 
additional pressure on data providers and potentially motivates them to choose a moderated rather than 
an open data-sharing mode (see Decision 12, Table 1). Overall, although the highly interconnected 
mHealth industry poses significant privacy and security concerns related to the unauthorized secondary 
use of data, the GDPR should force service providers to pay higher attention to this issue.  
In addition to regulations, a company involved in sharing mHealth data should consider potential ethical 
concerns (Challenge 8). Thus, an important ethical challenge arises when sharing mHealth data with an 
insurer in exchange for discounts. While such sharing should have positive implications by promoting a 
healthy lifestyle and enabling savings, it may also lead to discrimination against people that fail to hit the 
activity goals that the insurer sets. As such, data-sharing companies need to clearly describe to end users 
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how data consumers will use the data that end users authorize for sharing and what consequences they 
could face from sharing their data. 
Table 3. Summary of Identified Challenges of mHealth Data Sharing 
Challenge Potential solution 
1) Hesitance to use the data due to its unknown 
quality 
Introduce data quality-control mechanisms 
2) Hesitance to connect to a platform due to high 
integration costs 
Harmonize APIs along the industry to reduce the cost of 
integration; share the integration cost; use hub platforms to 
exchange the data 
3) Platform providers provide data models that do 
not suit complementors’ needs 
Develop a standardized industry-wide data model 
4) Data providers’ unwillingness to upload data to 
platforms (particularly hubs) due to the loss of 
data-sharing control 
Motivate data sharing by, for example, promoting data 
consumption and data complementarities. 
5)  The commoditization of hardware may weaken 
hardware producers’ competitive position 
Increased focus on providing services and governing shared data 
6) Potentially unsustainable free data sharing Apply Internet peer-like pricing for shared data 
7) Regulatory requirements 
Use authorization mechanisms to obtain end-users’ consent for 
data sharing; screen complementors based on their data use and 
protection policies 
8) Ethical concerns 
Demand complementors to describe how they will use shared data 
and what consequences users will face from sharing their data 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze the boundary resources of 21 web mHealth data-sharing platforms and identify 
18 key design and governance decisions that platform providers must make to manage data sharing in 
mHealth. In order to select platforms to analyze, we investigated 192 data-sharing integrations between 
37 mHealth companies that most actively participated in data sharing at the time we conducted the study. 
In doing so, we could uncover the mHealth data-sharing landscape (see Figure 3) and define high-level 
data-sharing strategies. Furthermore, we discuss the impact that the identified decisions may have on 
generativity, control, and related competitive risks. Finally, we determine challenges in designing and 
governing mHealth data sharing.  
We found two decisions to determine a company’s high-level data-sharing strategy: its data-sharing role 
and data-platform role. In making these decisions, a company can choose to become a provider, 
consumer, or both in combination (a prosumer). We discovered that, due to multiple possible 
configurations of data and platform prosumption, companies can choose between 15 high-level data-
sharing strategies, which we define as combinations formed from four elementary “clear” data and 
platform roles (see Table 2). We found that mHealth data sharing commonly includes the platform 
prosumer role, which means companies often not only provide a platform to third parties but also connect 
to other mHealth companies’ platforms. As such, the mHealth data-sharing ecosystem differs from some 
other platform ecosystems where platform providers and consumers (complementors) have clearly 
separated roles. We further discovered that not only platform providers (roles A and C in Table 2) but also 
data providers (role B) can manage data sharing, which can often regulate the scope of opened data even 
if they use another party’s platform to share data. However, apart from decisions related to governing data 
scope (Decisions 3-5 in Table 1), platform providers may use other decisions that platform consumers 
cannot use as levers for managing data sharing (Decisions 6-18). Moreover, the platform provider has the 
ultimate power to discontinue a complementor’s platform access, although such incidents can decrease 
the platform’s attractiveness to complementors.  
This paper makes several contributions to theory and practice. First, the results can help managers make 
decisions about designing and governing data sharing, particularly in mHealth. Thus, an mHealth 
company can first define its high-level data-sharing strategy using Decisions 1-2 and Table 2. Further, 
prospective platform providers (roles A and C in Table 2) can consider the identified decisions (namely, 
Decisions 3-18) and their potential impact (Section 5.1) when designing and governing their platform. In 
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turn, platform consumers (roles B and D) can use our findings to evaluate potential collaborators (i.e., 
platform providers). Moreover, our discussion on the challenges in designing and governing mHealth data-
sharing can benefit industry by drawing attention to the issues that companies should address to improve 
data sharing’s value. Although in this paper we focus on mHealth, which features unique characteristics 
(e.g., multiple small data providers connected P2P, sensitive shared data), our results may pertain to 
other domains where sensitive user data is shared and data sharing can similarly challenge the provider’s 
competitive position. For example, our results may prove useful to other consumers in IoT domains, such 
as smart homes or smart cars, where Web data-sharing platforms have started to emerge (Coppola & 
Morisio, 2016). Further, we contribute to more general literature on platform design and governance by 
analyzing increasingly ubiquitous data-sharing platforms and identifying unique design and governance 
decisions inherent to this platform type. Further still, we analyze access API-based platforms, which 
appear to use certain design and governance mechanisms specific to this platform’s architecture type, 
such as API usage-rate limitations. Finally, we contribute to the literature on data sharing, which has 
previously mostly focused on data sharing in the public domain or bilateral agreement-based data sharing 
between trusted partners.   
As with any other study, ours has some limitations that researchers should consider and address in future 
work. Thus, we mostly considered mHealth apps and services that shared fitness and wellness rather 
than medical data. We selected such apps and services due to our case-selection procedure in which we 
picked only companies that actively participated in mHealth data sharing. The rarity of medical data 
sharing may relate to stricter regulatory requirements imposed on medical mHealth products in general 
and data sharing in particular. However, future research should pay closer attention to the differences in 
designing and governing medical and fitness data sharing. Furthermore, although we studied boundary 
resources in detail, we did not develop apps for the considered platforms, which means that we may not 
have identified some implicit platform providers’ rules managing the platform and data use. Finally, 
although we define decisions that mHealth data-sharing companies must make, due to the study’s 
explorative and descriptive nature, we do not elaborate on the effect that selecting one or another 
alternative has on platform success. Future explanative studies may build on our results and address this 
research direction.  
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Appendix A: Studied mHealth Companies and APIs 
Table A1 shows the list of studied mHealth companies that we studied. We detail how we selected these 
companies in Section 3.1.  





Selected for study Link to developers’ portal / API reference 
Apple 
HealthKit 
Yes No, not Web API  





Endomondo Yes No, no open docs  
Fatsecret Yes Yes https://platform.fatsecret.com/api/ 
Fitbit Yes Yes https://dev.fitbit.com/build/reference/web-api/ 
Garmin Yes No, no open docs  
Glow No No  
Google Fit Yes Yes https://developers.google.com/fit/rest/ 
Human API Yes Yes https://hub.humanapi.co/docs 
iHealth Yes Yes http://sandbox.ihealthlabs.com/ dev_documentation_openapidoc.htm 
Jawbone Yes Yes https://jawbone.com/up/developer/ 
Kiqplan No No  
Lifesum No No  
Lose It No No  






Misfit Yes Yes https://build.misfit.com/docs/cloudapi/get_started 
Moves Yes Yes https://dev.moves-app.com/docs/ 
MyFitnessPal Yes No, no open docs  
Nike+ Yes Yes http://dev.nike.com/activities 
Nokia Health Yes Yes https://developer.health.nokia.com/api 
Omron Yes No, no open docs  
Pact No No  
Pear No No  





Qardio Yes No, no open docs  
Runcoach No No  
RunKeeper Yes Yes https://runkeeper.com/developer/healthgraph/app-ideas 
Runtastic No No  
Samsung 
Health 
Yes Yes https://developer.samsung.com/health/server 
Strava Yes Yes https://developers.strava.com/docs/reference/ 
Suunto 
(MovesCount) 
Yes No, no open docs  
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Table A1. The List of Studied mHealth Services and Data-sharing Platforms 
Tactio No No  
TomTom Yes Yes 
https://developer.tomtom.com/tomtom-sports-cloud/tomtom-sports-
cloud-documentation 
Wahoo Fitness Yes No, not Web API  
Validic Yes Yes, 2 APIs https://docs.validic.com/ 
Vitadock 
(Medisana) 
Yes Yes https://github.com/Medisana/vitadock-api/wiki 
* Manually selected API providers added to account for medical (rather than pure fitness) apps and services to ensure diversity; not 
among the 37 most actively participating in mHealth data-sharing services 
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